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I. INTRODUCTION
N our increasingly technological world, scientific expertise will
Iplay an important role in complex civil litigation. While scien-
t Joseph C. Kohn, B.A. University of Pennsylvania, J.D. Villanova Univer-
sity School of Law, is a partner in the Philadelphia law firm of Kohn, Nast, &
Graf, P.C. Mr. Kohn is co-counsel for the plaintiffs in In re Paoli Railroad Yard
PCB Litigation.
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tific expertise may be necessary to resolve a dispute, an important
issue arises concerning who will ultimately decide these complex
questions - judge, jury or the experts themselves. If the jury is to
be the factfinder, then the court must not prevent the jury from
evaluating the particular expertise and conclusions of the scien-
tific experts. If the scientist substitutes his judgment for that of
the factfinder in resolving the dispute, then we allow technical ex-
pertise to usurp our fundamental right to participate in the judi-
cial process. While the roles of the judge and the scientist are
critical to the orderly resolution of complex litigation, the deci-
sionmaking must ultimately be left to the jurors who have effec-
tively exercised this delegated power for centuries.' Accordingly,
in its recent decision in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this
basic right in holding that neither a judge nor a scientist may sub-
stitute his particular expertise for the factfinding of a lay jury. 3
The Paoli PCB situation is an example of a tragedy that is
recurring all too frequently throughout this country; the gradual
poisoning of workers and neighborhoods with environmental
contaminants. 4 The case was brought by thirty-eight individuals
1. See generally LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF
LIBERTY 95-110 (2d ed. 1988). Trial by jury was a fundamental concept ofjus-
tice among the early colonial settlers. Id. at 95-99. The American jury system
currently in existence is generally recognized as tracing its roots to the Magna
Carta, "the original guarantee of the jury trial." Id. at 99-100. The first English-
men settling in North America implemented the system in establishing colonies,
later incorporating the right in the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 95, 103-04. The
Declaration of Independence cited deprivation of a consistent right to trial by
jury as a significant factor leading to the separation of the colonies from Eng-
land. Id. at 100. For further discussion of the historical importance of the right
to trial by jury, see infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. See also Mark A.
Costantino & Daniel L. Master, Jr., The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in
Complex Civil Litigation: Historical Perspectives and a View From the Bench, 12 AM. IN-
TELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q. J. 279 (1984) (discussing importance of citizen participa-
tion in complex litigation from perspective of bench).
2. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
3. Id. The Third Circuit concluded, inter alia, that the district court had
improperly excluded important scientific evidence which should have been given
to ajury for proper consideration. Id. For a detailed discussion of the appellate
court's reasoning concerning the admissibility of expert evidence, see infra notes
48-77 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Merry v. Westinghouse, 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (plain-
tiffs' wells contaminated by toxic substances). See also Burns v. Jacquays Mining
Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1988)
(injury sustained by plaintiffs residing adjacent to asbestos-producing mill). See
generally Gregory L. Ash, Comment, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an
Increased Risk Cause of Action, 38 KAN. L. REV. 1087, 1089-1108 (discussing need
for tort reform in area of toxic exposure cases involving delayed manifestation
of illness).
[Vol. IV: p. I
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who lived, both literally and figuratively, on the wrong side of the
tracks.5 They lived downgrade from a railcar repair facility where
electric transformer fluids containing PCB contaminants had
leaked, spilled and been discharged over a number of years. 6 The
Paoli plaintiffs were generally of a working class socioeconomic
background. Their neighborhood was originally settled and
populated by the workers who operated the railcar facilities serv-
icing the more affluent surrounding region. Ironically, their eco-
nomic livelihood depended on their promixity to the source of
contamination.
The socioeconomic profile of the Paoli plaintiffs further un-
derscores a troubling inequity which can arise in "toxic tort" liti-
gation. To compound the lengthy and frustrating delay in
moving forward with the litigation, 7 these plaintiffs - unlike the
major corporate defendants they oppose - have no access. to the
leading scientists in the country. They do not fund scientific re-
search as does the defense in this case. As a result, obtaining the
necessary expertise to meet the required burden of proof in com-
plex litigation can become a daunting and often prohibitively ex-
pensive hurdle for an individual plaintiff with minimal resources.8
Notwithstanding these troubling policy concerns, the Third
Circuit took a major stride toward reaffirming basic principles of
5. In addition to the 38 plaintiffs in the federal court litigation, approxi-
mately 220 individuals who lived or worked near the Paoli Railroad Yard have
instituted actions in the state court.
6. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 835. The Third Circuit noted that toxic substances
found at the site resulted from "decades of PCB use in the Paoli railcar trans-
formers." Id. The PCBs were present in high concentrations "at the railyard
and in the ambient air and soil." Id.
7. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358, 363-64 (E.D. Pa.
1988). The opinion provides a capsulized summary of a portion of the summary
judgment motions and accompanying responses filed by both parties. While
plaintiffs' exposure to PCB contaminants can be traced back to the 1930's, as of
this writing, final disposition of the case is probably years away.
8. See, e.g., William G. Becker, The Use of Experts in Pretrial Discovery, in USING
EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES 7-13 (Melvin D. Kraft ed., 2d ed. 1982). Locating a
competent and effective expert witness involves an assessment of both the ex-
pert's professional qualifications as well as his or her ability to clearly articulate
the relevant knowledge to ajury. In addition, some consideration must be given
to how the opposing party may use any information elicited from the expert
during pretrial discovery. Id. at 10, 12; see also Richard H. Abramson, Presenting
Technologically Complex Cases to Lay Judges and Juries, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 259, 267 (1992). While an expert may have impressive credentials and be
well regarded in a particular field, it is essential to meet with the expert before
retaining his or her services. The author recommends, during the initial meet-
ing, asking the expert to explain one or more complex aspects of the technology
at issue. If the explanation is confusing or unclear, it is likely the jury will find it
equally confusing, and another expert should be considered. Id.
1993]
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the American justice system in its decision to uphold the juror as
the proper trier of fact. This article will trace the procedural his-
tory of the Paoli litigation, commencing with a summary of plain-
tiffs' expert testimony, the ensuing defense response, as well as
the district court's holding. The article will then examine the
Third Circuit's resolution of both the evidentiary issues and con-
flicts in methodology in reversing the district court decision.
Next, the article will focus on the role of the jury in complex civil
litigation from an historical perspective through its modern func-
tion as a panel deciding sophisticated factual disputes. Finally, it
will underscore the ongoing ability of the lay juror to serve as the
ultimate trier of fact and thereby preserve the fundamental wis-
dom of our legal system.
II. PAOLI LITIGATION - U.S. DISTRICT COURT HOLDING
A. Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Testimony
As a threshold matter, the Paoli record is replete with evi-
dence of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination at the
Paoli railyard over a forty year period. 9 The defendants in the
case were involved either in the ownership and operation of a re-
gional railroad maintenance facility, or the manufacturers of
PCBs and the transformer fluids used in the railcar transform-
ers. 0 In 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sued
to enforce appropriate cleanup response measures, and desig-
nated the railyard a Superfund site. "
9. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358, 361 (E.D. Pa.
1988). The district court noted that "the long-term presence and leakage of
PCBs at the site caused various levels of PCB contamination at the yard and in
the surrounding neighborhoods." Id.
10. Id. Among those owning and/or operating the railyard were the Penn-
sylvania Railroad and its successor, the Penn Central Transportation Company.
Amtrak has owned the site since 1976, while Conrail, and the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) have operated the facility as
part of a commuter rail service. SEPTA presently does not use PCB fluid in its
railcar transformers. Id. The manufacturer defendants are Monsanto Co. and
General Electric Corp. Id.
11. Id. at 361. See also The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982).
The Paoli railyard site was placed on the National Priorites List (NPL) estab-
lished pursuant to § 9605(c) to rank the sites presenting the most severe threat
to human health and the environment. Among the factors to be considered
when adding a hazardous site to the NPL are the following:
(A) The extent to which [the] hazard ranking system score for the facil-
ity is affected by the presence of any special study waste at, or any re-
lease from, such facility.
(B) Available information as to the quantity, toxicity, and concentra-
tion of hazardous substances that are constituents of any special study
[Vol. IV: p. I
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To survive defendants' motion for summary judgment, our
burden, as co-counsel for the plaintiffs, was to demonstrate a
causal connection between the PCB contamination at the railyard,
and the injuries suffered by the Paoli residents. 12 Prior to the
summary judgment motions, the district court had entered what
has been referred to as a "case management order" requiring the
plaintiffs to come forward with prima facie evidence of a justicia-
ble claim. 13 In response to that order plaintiffs set forth in both
affidavits and interrogatory answers the opinions of a number of
experts. One such expert, Deborah Barsotti, Ph.D., had partici-
pated in some of the groundbreaking research on the effect of
PCBs on animals and was qualified to interpret human clinical
tests.14 Dr. Barsotti received her doctorate in Pathology and was
employed by the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Regis-
try (ATSDR), affiliated with what we commonly call the Center for
Disease Control.' 5 Her work on PCBs has been cited in the Con-
waste at, or released from such facility, the extent of or potential for
release of such hazardous constituents, the exposure or potential expo-
sure to human population and the environment, and the degree of haz-
ard to human health or the environment posed by the release of such
hazardous constiuents at such facility.
CERCLA § 10 5(g)( 2 ), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(g)(2).
12. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 375. The district court set forth four elements to
be established in order to meet the requisite burden of proof: 1) that defendants
released PCBs into the environment; 2) that plaintiffs somehow ingested these
PCBs into their bodies; 3) that plaintiffs have an injury; and 4) that PCBs are the
cause of that injury. Id.
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's resolution of the causation issue, see
infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
13. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 362. The district court stated that the purported
purpose of the case management order was to allow the plaintiffs "to discover all
that they said they needed to know" to establish causation. Id. In addition, the
order was issued to allow the defense to discover necessary information to seek
summary judgment. Id. Each party was originally allowed only 90 days to com-
plete discovery but brief extensions were finally granted. Id.
14. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 839. Dr. Barsotti received her doctorate from the
University of Wisconsin Medical School, and has published several articles on
the toxicity of PCBs. Id.
15. Id. See also CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). ATSDR reports di-
rectly to the U.S. Surgeon General and was established to provide the following:
(A) in cooperation with the States, [to] establish and maintain a na-
tional registry of serious diseases and illnesses and a national registry
of persons exposed to toxic substances;
(B) [to] establish and maintain [an] inventory of literature, research,
and studies on the health effects of toxic substances;
(C) in cooperation with the States, and other agencies of the Federal
Government, [to] establish and maintain a complete listing of areas
closed to the public or otherwise restricted in use because of toxic sub-
stance contamination;
(D) in cases of public health emergencies caused or believed to be
caused by exposure to toxic substances, [to] provide medical care and
1993]
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gressional Record. 16
Notable among the expert opinions introduced by plaintiffs is
that of Arthur C. Zahalsky, Ph.D., who holds a doctorate in
microbiology, and who is a tenured professor of Immunology and
Human Diseases at Southern Illinois University.' 7 Plaintiffs also
provided the testimony of an internist, Harry Shubin, M.D.' 8 The
plaintiffs also introduced the affidavit' 9 of Ian C.T. Nisbet, Ph.D.,
who had been employed by EPA when it decided to outlaw fur-
ther use of PCBs except under very limited circumstances. 20
Other expert opinions offered by the plaintiffs included those of
Robert K. Simon, Ph.D., an expert in human exposure to chemi-
cals, 2 ' Benjamin Calesnick, M.D., a pharmacologist,2 2 William J.
Nicholson, Ph.D., a physicist, 2 3 and Dr. Herbert Allen, an envi-
testing to exposed individuals, including but not limited to tissue sam-
pling, chromosomal testing where appropriate, epidemiological stud-
ies, or any other assistance appropriate under the circumstances; and
(E) either independently or as part of other health status survey, [to]
conduct periodic survey and screening programs to determine relation-
ships between exposure to toxic substances and illness. In cases of
public health emergencies, exposed persons shall be eligible for admis-
sion to hospitals and other facilities and services operated or provided
by the Public Health Service.
CERCLA § 104(i)(A)-(E), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(A)-(E).
16. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 839. The court noted that Dr. Barsotti was also cited
in the legislative history of the Toxic Substances Control Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2629 (1977).
17. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 839. Dr. Zahalsky currently is specializing in the area
of scientific consultation for litigation. He divides his time between teaching and
research at the University and his private consulting work. Id.
18. Id. at 838, 840. Dr. Shubin submitted expert opinions on the issue of
causation for plaintiffs in two previous cases involving the Paoli site. He con-
cluded that the illnesses he diagnosed were caused by exposure to PCBs. Id.
19. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 371. Given the time restrictions in conducting
discovery sufficient to establish the requisite burden of proof, Dr. Nisbet's find-
ings were submitted in affidavit form. Id.
20. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 841. Dr. Nisbet received his doctorate from Cam-
bridge University in 1958. He has authored numerous articles in the area of
human health risks associated with exposure to toxic substances. Id.
21. Id. Dr. Simon received his doctorate degree from the University of
Maryland. He describes his areas of specialization as industrial hygiene, toxicol-
ogy and forensic analytical chemistry. Id.
22. Id. Dr. Calesnick is a Professor of Medicine at Hahnemann Medical
College where he also serves as Professor of Medicine and as Director of
Hahnemann's Division of Human Pharmacology. He has published over 100
articles on Pharmacology and has received numerous academic and professional
honors. His affidavit concluded that the Paoli plaintiffs require "medical surveil-
lance as a consequence of their exposure to PCBs at Paoli." Id.
23. Id. Dr. Nicholson received his doctorate degree from the University of
Washington and is currently a professor of Community Medicine at Mount Sinai
School of Medicine in New York City. Id. He conducted a series of tests con-
[Vol. IV: p. I
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ronmental chemist.2 4
In essence, plaintiffs' expert witnesses proffered evidence: (1)
disputing the methods and conclusions of the ATSDR Study con-
ducted to ascertain PCB levels in railyard neighborhood resi-
dents;25 (2) asserting the validity of animal studies and other
testing results in linking PCB exposure to human disease; 26 (3)
tracing PCBs in the plaintiffs' bodies to the Paoli railyard;2 7 and
(4) demonstrating the presence of immunological abnormalities
in the plaintiff group.28
B. Challenges from the Defense
In response, the defendants submitted what was referred to
as a "mega-affidavit," an affidavit signed by several leading physi-
cians, researchers, and experts supporting the defense position.2 9
These experts did not simply dispute the opinions proffered by
Doctors Barsotti, Zahalsky and the others; rather, they contended
that no competent or responsible scientist would take the position
set forth by plaintiffs' experts. 30 Among the principle areas of
cluding that: (1) PCBs have adverse health effects on humans; and (2) animal
studies have relevance for predicting human illness. Id.
24. Id. at 838-39. Dr. Allen is the current Director of Drexel University's
Environmental Studies Institute. He testified that plaintiffs' elevated PCB levels
were a result of exposure to contaminants at the Paoli railyard. Id.
25. See Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 372. The chief flaws in the ATSDR Study were
the following: (1) failure to take into account recent evidence concerning thresh-
old backgrounds of PCB exposure; (2) lack of correlation between PCB levels in
the soil and in the blood levels of the testing group; (3) exclusion of relevant
questions concerning contact with soil or other sources of PCB exposure; (4)
failure to focus on children in exposure studies; (5) lack of a control group to
determine comparable levels of exposure; (6) failure to adequately investigate
potential PCB exposure; (7) improper exclusion of certain individuals, which ne-
gated the study's random sample effect; (8) improper exclusion of an individual
with high PCB levels from the study group; and (9) improper calculation of PCB
levels of the general population, which negated the disproportionately high PCB
exposure of the Paoli plaintiffs. Id.
26. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 841.
27. Id. at 839. Dr. Barsotti conducted gas chromatography testing at the
Paoli site. By comparing chromatographic tracings of the plaintiffs' blood with
tracings of the soil at the site, she was able to demonstrate that PCB exposure
was directly linked to the railyard. She concluded that plaintiffs' PCB exposure
was a "substantial factor" in causing their illnesses. Id.
28. Id. at 840. Dr. Zahalsky opined that PCBs can damage the human im-
mune system "because they alter the cell production and replenishment rate of
immune cells, and impair the survivability of those cells." Id. He also stated the
the PCBs at Paoli were a "substantial factor" in causing damage to the plaintiffs'
immunological systems. Id.
29. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 366 n. 1 (listing medical and scientific personnel
included in joint affidavit).
30. Id. at 366. The filed affidavit asserted that, "[w]e have reviewed the
1993]
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dispute were: (1) the actual health risks associated with exposure
to PCBs;3 1 (2) the validity of applying animal studies and other
research to issues of human causation; 32 (3) the admissibility of
novel scientific techniques;3 3 and (4) the appropriate role of peer-
reviewed literature.3 4
At the outset, the defendants argued that generally accepted
scientific and medical opinion regarding PCBs indicates that non-
occupational exposure does not cause adverse health effects. 35
The validity of the ATSDR Study's findings was vigorously de-
fended 36 while the relevance of animal studies and other method-
ologies was contested as a questionable indicator of human
illness. 37 The introduction of meta-analysis, wherein data from a
number of different epidemiological studies are consolidated and
extensive literature on PCBs and have found that no reasonable medical or scientific
basis exists for concluding that chronic exposure to PCBs cause cancer, hyperten-
sion, cardiovascular diseases, elevations in serum triglycerides or cholesterol
levels, liver disease, joint irritation, pancytopenia, post-operative humans." Id.
(emphasis added).
31. The defendants cited a November 1987 ATSDR study, Toxicological Pro-
file For Selected PCBs (draft), assessing the relevant toxicological testing for PCB
exposure. The report concluded that "[a]dverse health effects have not been
observed in people in the United States with nonoccupational exposure." See
Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 365-66.
32. Id. at 367. The defense conceded that animal studies are useful to regu-
latory agencies in determining whether a chemical might pose a threat to public
health. However, they asserted that these studies are not appropriate in deter-
mining an individual defendant's liability in a tort action "where the question is
whether it is more likely than not that defendant caused plaintiff's injury." Id.
33. Id. at 373. See also Anthony Z. Roisman, junk Law'." Defense Attack on
Causation, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 51. The author advocates the admissibility of
what has been referred to as "junk science." He refutes the traditional scientific
assertion that epidemiological studies are necessary to establish causation in ex-
posure cases. Citing the Third Circuit decision in Paoli, the author recognizes
that "[s]ome courts have finally begun to see the fallacy of relying solely on
epidemiology in causation decisions. The most promising movement in this di-
rection has come from the Third Circuit." Id. at 53.
34. See Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 373. See also Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857-58. The
Third Circuit noted that one of the reports under attack by the defense was that
of Dr. Nicholson. In his affidavit, Dr. Nicholson states that his report was re-
viewed by "cooperating researchers and the Industrial Diseases Standards
Panel." Id.
35. For a discussion of the defense's view of health risks to humans result-
ing from PCB exposure, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36. See Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 365-66.
37. See Roisman, supra note 33, at 55-56. Ironically, some defendants in
toxic tort cases now insist on animal studies where strong epidemiological data
supports plaintiffs' assertions. Their intent is to argue that animal studies must
be duplicated in biological mechanisms in order to confirm plaintiffs' results.
Since the mechanisms which control diseases like cancer are still not fully under-
stood, the insistence on animal studies would essentially preclude a plaintiff
from proving causation. Id.
[Vol. IV: p. I
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re-examined to obtain further information, was challenged by the
defense as a novel scientific technique. 38 Finally, the defense
claimed that the meta-analysis submitted as evidence by plaintiffs'
expert had not been properly peer-reviewed. 39
C. District Court's Admissibility Rulings
Faced with conflicting expert evidence, the district court ex-
cluded all of the evidence set forth by plaintiffs, including the ex-
perts' opinions, 40 and granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment. 4 In deciding the critical issue of the admissibility of
novel scientific techniques, the court relied on its interpretation
of the factors set forth in United States v. Downing.42 These factors
included: (1) the soundness and reliability of the technique em-
ployed in producing the scientific evidence; (2) the possibility of
overwhelming, confusing or misleading the jury by admitting the
evidence; and (3) the nexus between the proffered scientific evi-
dence and the factual issues in dispute.43
In a somewhat cryptic analysis, the court found that all three
factors supported the granting of defendants' motion. 44 First, the
court accepted the defense's arguments that meta-analysis is not a
reliable scientific technique and that the report advanced by the
plaintiff's expert, Dr. Nicholson, had not been properly peer-re-
viewed. 45 Further, the court reasoned that Dr. Nicholson's study
would confuse the jury "because of its scientific nature and his
credentials so that [the jury] would make more of it than it actu-
ally deserved." '46 Finally, the court found that the Nicholson re-
38. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 373.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 375. The district court opinion stated that the defense expert's
assertions refuting the evidence of higher PCB levels in plaintiffs' bodies is "the
only legally admissible evidence in this case." Id.
41. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 835. The Third Circuit noted that the district court
had granted summary judgment for the defendants "on all claims except those
for property damage and response costs under CERCLA." Id. (footnote
omitted).
42. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). The Downing case involved, inter alia, the
admissibility of novel scientific testimony to establish the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. See id. at 1232-37.
43. Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 373 (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237).
44. Id. at 373. The district court provided little if any explanation for its
ruling that plaintiff failed to meet the Downing considerations. In dismissing Dr.
Nicholson's evidence concerning causation, the court disputed both its admissi-
bility as a novel scientific technique and its relevance. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Despite the district court's concern with the jury's perceived inabil-
ity to determine the weight of Dr. Nicholson's credentials, the court later ques-
1993]
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port "could not be the basis for anyone to say with a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty that some particular person's disease
...was caused by PCBs." 47 Essentially, the court enabled the
defense experts to neatly extricate themselves from what would
have been a conventional battle of the experts. However, as the
appellate court later determined, the credibility of the experts
and the validity of their asserted positions is a question more
properly left to the members of the jury.
III. THIRD CIRCUIT RESOLUTION OF EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Rule 702 and the Reaffirmation of United States v. Downing
In its 1990 decision setting aside the district court's eviden-
tiary rulings,48 the Third Circuit found both procedural and sub-
stantive flaws in the lower court's analysis. 49 Procedural errors
cited by the appellate court included the district court's failure to
allow plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to present their evi-
dence, 50 its ruling on an incomplete factual record, and its inade-
quate articulation of the bases for its rulings. 51 The appellate
court further criticized the lower court's procedural application of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 52
Substantively, a number of evidentiary issues arose in the re-
mand of the district court's holding. One such issue was the rele-
vant qualifications of the experts. The Third Circuit addressed
this evidentiary question by criticizing "the district court's insis-
tence on a certain kind of degree or background [as] inconsistent
with our jurisprudence in this area."53 As the court noted, the
Rule's language and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes al-
low a person with a variety of skills and backgrounds to qualify as
an expert. 54 The court, in resolving the Rule 702 issue, needed to
tioned "whether the plaintiffs' experts really are experts." Id. at 375-76. The
court found that many experts "seem to have very little formal academic training
in the areas in which they testify." Id.
47. Id. at 373.
48. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
49. Id. at 836.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of the
relevant Federal Rules of Evidence in the Paoli decision, see infra notes 65-77
and accompanying text.
53. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855.
54. See FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 provides that, "[i]f scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evi-
[Vol. IV: p. I
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determine whether or not a toxicologist, rather than a physician
or medical doctor, could opine about the injuries to a plaintiff as a
result of the contamination. 55 Specifically, the court was faced
with an argument that a physician may be better able than a toxi-
cologist to draw conclusions concerning injuries resulting from
prolonged exposure to PCBs.
The court's decision supported plaintiffs' contention that
while the defense may legitimately dispute an expert's qualifica-
tions, conclusions as to reliability go to the weight of the opinion
and should be a decision properly left to the members of the jury.
The trial court is not the appropriate decisionmaker in weighing
the merit of expert opinions, particularly on a motion for sum-
mary judgment involving a cold paper record. 56 Moreover, in de-
termining the reliability of scientific evidence submitted by
experts, "courts must err on the side of admission rather than
exclusion." 57
The Third Circuit decision provided additional guidance for
judicial consideration of the three factors set forth in Downing. In
determining the appropriate level of reliability, the court noted
that "the reliability requirement must not be used as a tool by
which the court excludes all questionably reliable evidence." 58
The court noted that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it
would not require a 95% reliability demonstration as might a sci-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." Id. See also FED R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's
note. The note provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited
merely to the "scientific" and "technical" but extend to all "special-
ized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense,
but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education." Thus within the scope of the rule are not only experts in
the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians, physicists, and architects,
but also the large group sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as
bankers or landowners testifying to land values.
Id.
55. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855.
56. It is interesting to note the subtle distinctions in judicial characteriza-
tion of expert background and qualifications, as described in the district court
and circuit court opinions. See, e.g., Paoli, 706 F. Supp. at 369-70 (minimizing
Dr. Barsotti's qualifications to discuss plaintiffs' illnesses). Cf Paoli, 916 F.2d at
839 (highlighting Dr. Barsotti's achievements and contributions to U.S. Govern-
ment research and Congressional debate). See also supra discussion note 46.
57. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857.
58. Id. See also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941,
956 (3d Cir. 1990) (advocating admission of any appropriate evidence designed
to assist trier of fact).
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entist in a laboratory. Conversely, the court stated that it would
not arbitrarily demand that evidence be 51% accurate. 59 The
court reasoned that a flexible approach would simply take into
account whether or not the proffered analytical method would as-
sist the trier of fact. 60 As there had been no disagreement in the
record concerning the reliability of meta-analysis as a scientific
method, the court concluded that the evidence was improperly
excluded. 61
The appellate court summarily dismissed the requirement
that expert testimony be subjected to peer review, finding no such
requirement in the Federal Rules of Evidence.62 While reaffirm-
ing the flexibility of the Downing analysis, the Third Circuit em-
phasized the less discretionary requirement of a "developed
record and specific findings on reliability issues." 63 Noting the
absence of in limine hearings and expert depositions, the appel-
late court held that it had no basis to make a proper admissibility
determination. 64
B. Rule 403 and the Function of Summary Judgment
The Third Circuit also questioned the district court's applica-
tion of the Rule 403 balancing requirement 65 when it excluded
plaintiffs' expert evidence.66 The court noted that the determina-
tion of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice should rarely be made in a preliminary
phase of litigation, particularly in a summary judgment motion. 67
59. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857.
60. Id. See generally Robert A. Shults, Expert Witnesses in Environmental and
Toxic Tort Cases, 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 533, 546-48 (1991) (providing overview of
varying judicial approaches to determining validity of expert testimony).
61. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857. The court noted that if the defense had pro-
duced any evidence that meta-analysis is an inaccurate scientific method, then
there might be a basis for excluding meta-analysis as a reliable method. Id.
62. Id. at 858 (citing DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 858-59. The court maintained that, as a result of the inadequate
record, "[w]e cannot affirm what we cannot review." Id. at 859.
65. See FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-weighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence." Id. (emphasis added).
66. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859. The court also cites Downing, 753 F.2d at 1241,
to affirm the efficacy of the in limine hearing in conducting appropriate factfind-
ing. Id.
67. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 859 ("[W]e stress that pretrial Rule 403 exclusions
should rarely be granted.").
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The court reasoned that there is no harm at the stage of litigation
where there is no jury empaneled. Moreover, the preliminary
phases of litigation involve an evaluation of the necessity of as-
sembling a jury and beginning a trial where a more complete rec-
ord would be required. 68 The Third Circuit reasoned that if the
district court invoked Rule 403 at this early stage of litigation a
"virtual surrogate" for a trial would be necessary. 69 A surrogate
trial, essentially duplicating a real trial at the summary judgment
stage, makes little sense, particularly in an era of growing resist-
ance to protracted litigation.
C. Conflicts in Methodology - Rule 703 Issues
The appeals court also questioned the district court's appli-
cation of Rule 70370 in Paoli. The appellate court noted that the
lower court's decision had few, if any, clear factual findings and
that the court had essentially chosen among conflicting opinions
rather than excluded plaintiffs' opinions on evidentiary
grounds. 7' The appellate court emphasized the Rule 703 requi-
sites established in In rejapanese Electronic Products.72 In particular,
the court reaffirmed the Japanese Electronics findings concerning
the reliability of expert testimony: " '[t]he proper inquiry is not
what the court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant
discipline deem it to be.' -7 The court further emphasized the
requirement to compile a full and adequate basis for review by
specifically delineating the data that experts in the field find
68. Id. "We believe that Rule 403 is a trial-oriented rule. Precipitous Rule
403 determinations, before the challenging party has had an opportunity to de-
velop the record, are therefore unfair and improper." Id.
69. Id. at 859-60. The record on the point at issue would have to be suffi-
ciently complete for such a process to occur. Id.
70. FED. R. EvID. 703. Rule 703 provides as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853.
72. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983). Japanese Electronics involved an action by
American television manufacturers against Japanese television manufacturers
for alleged antitrust, tariff, price discrimination, and antidumping violations.
The Third Circuit held, inter alia, that the district court erred in substituting its
determination concerning admissibility of expert materials relied upon as evi-
dence. Id. at 277-78.
73. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853 (quoting Japanese Electronics, 723 F.2d at 276).
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reliable.74
The court further held that the district court's treatment of
certain novel scientific technique test results did not reach the fac-
tual inquiry necessary to clearly support its exclusion of the evi-
dence. 75 Moreover, the district court did not allow the plaintiffs
adequate opportunity to discover or challenge the scientific data
proffered by the defense experts. 76 Again, the appellate court un-
derscored the need for a trial-like procedure to properly assess
admissibility of expert evidence. 77
IV. MEDICAL MONITORING - THE LANDMARK PROVISION
The Third Circuit's resolution of certain evidentiary issues,
while significant, did not break new ground. While the clarifica-
tion of conflicting interpretations in applying the Federal Rules of
Evidence was notable, I submit that there was nothing remarkable
about the evidentiary portion of the decision. Perhaps a more
significant holding was the recognition of the medical monitoring
claim, the first appellate court decision recognizing a viable cause
of action for the tort in Pennsylvania. 78
The court defined an action for medical monitoring as one
which "seeks to recover only the quantifiable costs of periodic
medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical
74. Id. The court cited the following areas as not constituting a proper re-
viewable foundation: (1) no specific reference to the evidence chosen by the dis-
trict court as credible; (2) no discussion of the theory on which it rejected certain
expert opinions; and (3) no identification of those opinions it meant to exclude.
Id.
75. Id. at 854. The district court found the "consensus conclusion" of the
scientists' findings to indicate that plaintiffs' illnesses were not caused by the
PCBs at the Paoli site. The lower court, however, did not consider evidence that
certain plaintiffs may have been exposed to other contaminants as well as PCBs.
Id.
76. Id. at 854-55. Specifically, the court held that the district court should
have conducted an in limine hearing, should have allowed oral argument on the
evidentiary issues, and should have tailored its case management order to "give
plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to discover defendants' experts' positions."
Id. at 854.
77. Id. at 855. The court noted that "[a]t least some process should have
been devised to afford plaintiffs a surrogate for that trial scenario where the
equivalent evidentiary exclusion and adverse judgment might occur. On this
ground alone, the summary judgment would have to be set aside." Id.
78. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 849. The court noted that while neither the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court nor the Superior Court had touched the issue of medi-
cal monitoring, a trial court decision indicated that this type of claim might
proceed past the summary judgment stage. Id. at 849 n.20. For a discusssion of
prior Pennsylvania trial court decision addressing the issue, see Merry v. West-
inghouse, 684 F. Supp. 847, 848-50 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
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harm." 79 Moreover, the court stated that the issue of whether a
plaintiff requires medical monitoring is a reasonable jury determi-
nation.80 In so holding, the court outlined several significant pol-
icy reasons for recognizing the tort: (1) toxic exposure injuries,
even if latent, can at some point cause significant harm; (2) the
irresponsible discharge of toxic chemicals should be deterred;
and (3) plaintiff's early detection and treatment of injuries should
be encouraged. 8'
V. ROLE OF THE JURY IN COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION
A. Historical Significance of the Seventh Amendment Right to
a jury Trial
In resolving the evidentiary disputes at issue in Paoli, the
Third Circuit simply reasserted the proper roles of the court and
the jury in settling civil controversies. Since the founding of this
country, the jury has played an integral role in maintaining public
confidence in our court system.8 2 While the Framers of the Con-
stitution may not have shared a common vision of the utility of
the jury in resolving civil disputes, they generally agreed that the
institution of the jury was to be held "in high estimation." 83
Their adoption of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
formally recognized and preserved this fundamental right.8 4
79. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 850 (distinguishing medical monitoring claims from
enhanced risk claims).
80. Id. at 851. The court found that the jury must determine whether medi-
cal monitoring is "probably, not just possibly necessary." Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 852. The court noted that recognizing the tort does not require
judicial speculation about the probability of future injury. Courts must simply
decide only if medical supervision, a much less costly remedy, is warranted. Id.
82. See CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE SERIES, FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERAL-
ISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (John P. Ka-
minski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989). Between 1763 and 1788, an intense debate
raged in this country between the Federalists and Antifederalists concerning the
nature of the newly formed American government. Federalists advocated a
strong central government and a federal constitution. Antifederalists argued
that a central government would endanger the sovereignty of the states, and
feared any federally mandated Bill of Rights. Id. Antifederalists also feared that
a federal constitution might endanger the established system ofjury trials. Id. at
120. Alexander Hamilton, a leading Federalist, advocated preservation of the
trial by jury despite Constitutional silence on the issue. See THE FEDERALIST No.
83, at 516-32 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888). Hamilton
viewed the trial by jury as a "valuable check upon corruption . . .[because] it
would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury" to achieve an unjust result.
Id. at 523.
83. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 82, at 521.
84. See Costantino & Master, supra note 1, at 281. Generally, the right to
trial by jury in civil cases was supported by early Americans. There were some
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From early in the nation's history, commercial and mercan-
tile interests have expressed their discomfort with lay juries decid-
ing "complex" or "technical" issues. This tension has been a
constant threat to the right to jury trial. The nation gradually
evolved from an agricultural society into a mercantile economy
where commercial affairs were dominant.85 Significantly, the lat-
ter part of the eighteenth century marked the first attempts by the
legal and commercial communities to curtail the role of the ju-
ries. 86 Merchants and insurance companies, in particular, felt
threatened by what they viewed as a growing pattern of large jury
awards to plaintiffs, inhibiting further industrial growth. 87
As a result of the move to restrict the power of juries in de-
ciding commercial disputes, a trend emerged which would lay the
foundation for modern evidentiary practices. In the early part of
the nineteenth century, the traditional view that juries were the
proper judges of both fact and law began to change. A sharper
distinction was drawn between law and fact with a resulting func-
tional separation of judge and jury.88 For the first time, the pre-
siding judge in a civil matter was required to provide the jury with
an opinion concerning every relevant point of law involved in a
case.8 9 This change in the judicial role broadened considerably,
emerging as the now familiar principle that issues of law are to be
Federalists who did not view this right as essential to the preservation of liberty,
but feared its non-inclusion would defeat the efforts to ratify the Constitution.
Id. See also R. Ben Hogan, III, The Seventh Amendment, TRIAL, Sept. 1987, at 76
(discussing ongoing significance of historic origins of Seventh Amendment).
85. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860, at 141 (1977). The author notes that by 1800 there was a corre-
sponding marked increase in commercial lawyers in this country, servicing the
newly emerging and powerful merchant community. Accordingly, the legal
community became more sensitive to the impact of commercial law decisions.
Id.
86. Id. at 141-42. Merchants were often adversely affected by unfavorable
jury decisions. The legal community joined with the mercantile industry to re-
strict the scope ofjuries, employing two basic procedural devices: (1) submitting
points of law directly to judges to avoid jury deliberation on the issue; and (2)
expanding the use of new trials if the jury verdict was "contrary to the weight of
the evidence." Id.
87. Id. at 141. Marine insurance litigation between merchants and insur-
ance companies increased significantly, fostering fear in the mercantile commu-
nity that their rights were being regulated by lay jurors with little knowledge of
the law. Id.
88. Id. at 142-43. At the end of the eighteenth century, the prevailing view
was that juries were competent to determine questions of law. The emerging
emphasis on the separation of functions led to more elaborate procedural con-
trol ofjuries. Wherejury instructions had once been advisory, they later became
mandatory as the jury's power to determine the law declined. Id.
89. Id.
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decided by the court while issues of fact are left to the jury's de-
termination. 90 A significant consequence of the delineation of the
roles of judges and jurors was a new judicial control of jury
verdicts.91
B. Preservation of the Jury as Factfinder
With the advent of the law/fact decisional dichotomy, the in-
evitable question of the competence of a jury as factfinder arose
as litigation became more complex. 92 While the Supreme Court
has touched on the subject, there has been no firm resolution of
the proper role of the jury in complex cases. 93 While some practi-
tioners have suggested authorizing exceptions to the Seventh
Amendment right for complex cases or empanelling special ex-
pert juries,9 4 support for the traditional jury remains strong.9 5
A recent symposium on civil juries, co-sponsored by the
Brookings Institute of Washington, D.C. and the American Bar
Association's (ABA) Litigation Section,9 6 underscored the trepi-
dation experienced by most attorneys at the prospect of substitut-
ing the judge for the jury as factfinder in complex litigation.9 7
90. Horwitz, supra note 85, at 143. One unforecasted result of the new jury
procedure was the existence of multiple and often conflicting instructions to thejury. This in turn increased the number of new trials ordered for errors in pro-
ceedings below the appellate court level. Id.
91. Id. The author notes that these procedural changes also allowed the
development of a "uniform and predictable body of judge-made commercial
rules." Id.
92. See generally Joe S. Cecil, Citizen Comprehension of Dificult Issues: Lessons
Learned from Civil Juy Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727 (1991) (arguing that while
technical nature of civil trials has increased, lay juror has unrealized potential for
meaningful participation in proceedings). But see Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al.,
A Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Com-
plex Cases, 37 KAN. L. REV. 61, 66-67 (1988) (echoing concern that uncom-
prehending jury could unwittingly produce unjust decision).
93. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). In a footnote of the
Ross opinion, the court briefly addressed how the legal nature of an issue may be
determined, including in its criteria "the practical abilities and limitations ofju-
ries" as a consideration. Id. at 538 n.10. See also Note, The Right to aJury Trial in
Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REv. 898 (1979) (discussing applicability of
Ross test and separation of legal and equitable issues).
94. See, e.g., Wilkinson et al., supra note 92, at 104-05 (advocating greater
use of special masters and court-appointed panels of experts).
95. See, e.g., Costantino & Master, supra note 1, at 286-87. The authors aver
that limiting the traditional Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in complex
cases "where there are no clear and compelling historical or contemporary
precedents is indeed ill-conceived and premature." Id.
96. See Emily Couric,Jury System Alive and Well, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 32.
97. Id. Notably, counsel for large corporations frequently prefer juries to
judges as factfinders despite their occasional frustration with the "unpredictabil-
ity and irrationality of jury verdicts." Id. at 32-33.
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While acknowledging the average juror's frequent lack of the req-
uisite educational background to properly assess complex scien-
tific or other highly technical evidence, the symposium
participants overwhelmingly advocated the fundamental role of
the jury. 98
Despite the burdens placed upon jurors to digest highly tech-
nical information in a complex matter, the preservation of the
traditional jury system continues to override any movement to-
wards radical change. While modern controversies frequently de-
mand more sophisticated evidence, the solution lies in improving
the methods of educating jurors rather than in diminishing their
roles.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Paoli case presented a particularly challenging array of
complex evidentiary issues for resolution. Despite the complex-
ity, jurors are capable of digesting and resolving these kinds of
expert disputes if given proper expert witness assistance. How-
ever, this expert evidence must be set forth for proper jury delib-
eration as is other relevant evidence, in open court following
standard trial procedures. There is an inherent danger where
"super scientists" pre-determine the scientific parameters con-
trolling the litigants in a court of law. If outcome-determinative
information is withheld from a jury in order to mitigate the com-
plexity of a case, the foundation of our legal system may be seri-
ously eroded.
98. Id. Among the preliminary recommendations reported by the Sympo-
sium organizers were the following:
(1) Permit jurors to take a more active role in a trial. They could ...
take notes, submit written questions, and [] review the trial record on
computer during deliberation.
(2) Liberalize evidence rules to make more information available to
jurors.
(3) Allow greater use of technology, such as videotaped testimony and
computerized exhibits.
(4) Ensure that juries better represent the community.
(5) Return to larger juries and permit alternate jurors to deliberate.
(6) Follow a "one-day/one-trial" standard for jury service, in which ju-
rors not called the first day for trial are dismissed.
(7) Provide better pay, benefits, and conditions for jurors, along with a
"juror bill of rights" that could, for example, spell out a right to decline
media interviews.
(8) [R]educe budget shortfalls through more extensive use of alternate
dispute resolution and better judicial management.
(9) Resist efforts to reduce the jury's role.
Id. (emphasis added).
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From the earliest days of this country one of the single issues
uniting the Founders' task of establishing a lasting form of demo-
cratic government was the fundamental importance and value of a
trial by jury. Although arguments have been made throughout
the nation's history that juries are something to distrust or that
they are somehow a lesser means of resolving disputes, their par-
ticipation in the judicial system is absolutely vital. As Professor
Wolfram noted in his study of the Seventh Amendment:
[T]he anti-federalists were not arguing for the insti-
tution of the civil jury trial in the belief that jury trials
were short, inexpensive, decorous, and productive of the
same decisions that judges sitting without juries would
produce. The inconveniences of jury trial[s] were ac-
cepted precisely because in important instances, through
its ability to disregard substantive rules of law, the jury
would reach a result that the judge either could not or
would not reach. Those who favored the civil jury were
not misguided tinkerers with procedural devices, they
were, for the day, libertarians who avowed that impor-
tant areas of protection for litigants in general, and for
debtors in particular, would be placed in grave danger
unless it were required that juries sit in civil cases. 99
In conclusion, jurors are capable of deciding issues involving
proper methodology of scientific proof if given the opportunity
and proper expert evidentiary assistance. They have proven
themselves competent to decide equally complex issues in anti-
trust cases, to hear economic testimony on the projected rate of
inflation, and to determine the sanity of criminal defendants. Ac-
cordingly, when the jury is finally convened in the Paoli case, I am
confident that it will competently evaluate the merits of the scien-
tific testimony and will ultimately do justice in arriving at its
decision.
99. See C.W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 671-76 (1973).
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